Problems with the Reset Button

Jed Babbin, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for George HW Bush, recently published an op-ed in The Washington Examiner titled "The pravda about Hillary Clinton's Russian 'reset'".

In the article, he lambasts the failures of the reset citing both the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011 (freezes assets and bars entry into the US for individuals associated with Magnitsky's death) and the recent, headline-grabbing Dima Yakovlev Law (which does the same thing as its American counterpart, but goes further by banning the apoption of Russian children by US citizens).

Gotta admit... it looks pretty cool

He goes on to criticize Russian submarine deployments near our east coast, the development of new Russian weapons systems such as the T-50 stealth fighter and the new, highly advanced Borei Class Nuclear Missile Submarine, and of course, the troubling relationships between Russia, Syria, and Iran.

He concludes by saying, "By any objective measure, Clinton's 'reset' hasn't worked".

He is completely right, the reset has not worked at all... However, Babbin fails to account for our own failures in resetting relations.

The real question I'm getting at is "why would Russia want to reset relations with us?"

Courtesy BBC

1) We continue to plan, promote, and install the European Anti-Ballistic Missile shield despite the fact that the hosting nations don't want them, and the Kremlin will move missile batteries to counter them.

2) We expect Russia to get on board with our plans to remove dangerous leaders- Gaddafi, Assad, Ahmadinejad- when Russia has a financial and geopolitical interest not to do so (alliances based on multi-billion dollar weapon contracts).

3) We have given Russia a pass on human right violations before -most notably in Chechnya- so, in their eyes, why the sudden fuss over Sergei Magnitsky?

So on point number 1: The United States has a commitment to protect its allies in Europe from any foreign threat-- including Russia.  But why do the missile batteries have to be ours? If Poland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, etc... are concerned of the threat from either Russia or Iran, why can't they operate a system purchased from us? That would remove US personel from the equation and allow the continent to defend itself from foreign threat with the promise of US backup in the event of something catastrophic.

Number 2: Obviously there is a giant moral problem surrounding the above mentioned leaders. They kill their citizens, saber-rattle with their neighbors, and all around just aren't nice people. However, for Russia, they are good customers and some of their only remaining allies following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Russia sees the West taking away its allies and disrupting a solid source of revenue. We won't be able to have a negotiation with Russia about these leaders without negotiating the future of arms agreements. Arguing morals has not and will not work; we need speak the global language of finance.

Number 3: The Russian concepts of democracy and human rights are completely different from ours. Democracy is a new experience (that the old guard does not like) and human rights have never been held in high regard.  The state is and always has been the highest authority. Russia sees NGO's from the west as groups of individuals deliberately meddling in their affairs with money from Washington. In several cases I'm sure that is exactly what happened, and I honestly hope they succeed in making Russia more democratic... but...

If we are going to sit across the negotiating table from Mr. Putin, we can't ride in on our high horse about human rights. We have no problem acknowledging the failures of other nations in human rights, but when it comes to our own faults we remain silent.

The first step in resetting relations with Moscow is admitting that we are 50% of the problem. Only then can a true reset happen. The US and Russia will not see eye to eye on all issues, but using increasingly combative and reactionary rhetoric with Russia will only push us back to where we were 50 years ago- the Cold War.

Why is the defense budget a museum piece?

Look But Don't Touch

On the eve of 2013, there is one word on every pundits lips- sequestration.

This will not happen

Sequestration is the automatic tax increases and budget cuts that will be imposed on January 2nd if the United States goes sailing over the "fiscal cliff". The major concern is that these cuts and tax increases will send the United States back into a recession.

On the table is $100 billion in cuts per year for 10 years... or $1 trillion dollars

$1 trillion is a large cut, but considering our gigantic debt and geopolitical conditions, it is necessary.



Why? 

Well, because the world is becoming more peaceful.

That sounds contradictory to what we see on the news every day, but the reality is that a war between major powers has not occurred since 1945. There have been plenty of proxy wars, and a large increase in civil wars, but the reality remains the same-- superpowers are not fighting.

What's more, the nature of war has changed. There is no threat from a large standing force. What was done with boots on the ground sixty years ago can now be done by pressing a button-- this is a fact the Pentagon refuses to recognize.

With advances in technology and training, we can accomplish a whole lot more with a whole lot less. And with the US refocusing on the Pacific, we now have the perfect opportunity to reorganize our military and even take a substantial dent out of our debt.

How?

Decrease the total number of personel and sell assets.

The foes faced by the US today are stateless, small, and hard to find.  As we saw in Afghanistan, sending a ton of soldiers didn't win the war; it simply put a lot of targets on the ground to shoot at. By decreasing the total number of our personel, we would open up the possibility of maintaining a small but extremely efficient fighting force. Basically, train the number of actively deployed men to a special forces level of readiness.

This would allow our forces to go in quietly, do what they need to do, and get out without committing billions in resources to the operation. It would also allow us to maintain a strong R&D budget, and hyper-efficient standing force (small number of highly advanced aircraft and numerous ABM batteries) on US soil.

I've talked before about selling our assets abroad, and I think that in light of the ongoing budget battle it remains a necessity. There is no conceivable reason to field over 70,000 men in Europe- even in a support capacity. By selling off our European assets- the bases, outdated aircraft, and weapons- we could generate extra revenue to pay down our deficit. The Department of Defense gets a win from the initial purchase and by no longer having to pay for maintenance, staff, and upkeep. The defense contractors (such as Boeing, Raytheon, and BAE systems) get a win because they will need to supply parts, maintenance, and ammunition to the European Union.

What about jobs?

Obviously, all that I have outlined above will mean that many people will lose their jobs. There is no avoiding that, but what is more important: jobs (short term) or deficit ?

If we don't need so much manpower to protect our national interests, why do we still have them? Couldn't that manpower be put to better use here in the US? Our infrastructure is dangerously outdated, and no matter how much I'm against big government, it would be nice to have the Works Progress Administration around to repair all of the things they built in the 1930's.

In conclusion, is sequestration bad? In the short term, it won't be pretty... but ten years from now, will it be looked at as the thing that saved us from bankruptcy? Will it be the motivator for creating a better and safer style of national defense? I certainly hope so.

What Comes After Democracy?

Over the last century, the world has become more democratic. Kings, Fascists, Tyrants, and Colonialists have disappeared from most governments in the world.

Most people attribute this to globalization through the trade and financial markets. Former Soviet States are joining (or attempting to join) NATO, the EU, WTO, etc... The Arab Spring has swept autocrats out of power across the Middle East. Despite the continuing unrest and problems throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the African Union has stepped up its ability to promote peace on the continent, notably in Darfur, Sudan and Somalia. Even the military government of Myanmar had a historic election this year.

There is no question that democracy leads to less conflict between other democratic nations, and that democracies give greater value to human rights and individual liberty than non-democratic states. My question is what comes next? Is there a higher system of government than democracy? Will technology allow individuals more influence over the government, or will it be used to give government more power over the individual? Will democracy evolve into something new, or devolve into something we've seen before? What comes after democracy?

I posted that rather innocuous question on Facebook, and one of my friends gave a pretty awesome answer:

"I say servitude follows democracy. If I had been living in Athens since Pericles, I would have been lorded over by my own democratic assembly, Spartans, Macedonians, Romans and their Greek speaking Roman heirs (Byzantines), Frankish Crusaders, Greek Romans (Byzantines) again in their last bid for survival and then Turks. I would then live under Monarchy, Nazi occupation, Dictatorship and finally this current system which now lives under the EU. After living all that time, I'm not sure whether I'd be so confident that any system of government works that well or truly has people's best interests in mind."

"Hipsteristotle"

While this is a pretty awesome answer for what historically occurred following Athenian democracy, it does not account for one thing: Athens was unique. Essentially, Athenian democracy was "hipster democracy". Athenians liked democracy before it was cool.

With so many states now democratic, and with the levels of conflict between states greatly diminishing -- what comes next? Here is where my friends answer definitely applies. Servitude does come next; however, it is not servitude to an outside, nondemocratic power. It is servitude within the democracy.

I recently read an incredibly interesting paper by Albert Bartlett, a retired physics professor from the University of Colorado, titled "Democracy Cannot Survive Overpopulation". The paper puts forward two items that impact liberty: 1) that as populations grow, the relative power for one person to give input on government decisions decreases and 2) that as technology advances, so does the human ability to annoy each other with those advancements -- translating into more legislation and regulation (i.e. loss of freedom).

Bartlett's points make total sense, and to a very large degree he is right. Earth is a finite resource, and constant population growth will eventually be unsustainable. However, I do not think that technology will destroy democracy through regulation. If anything, I think that technology could greatly improve democracy.

Over the past century, there has been a trend that smaller administrative areas wish to break away from the larger nation. The collapse of the Soviet Union created 15 new countries. The break up of Yugoslavia created another 7. Africa is constantly changing, most recently with the creation of South Sudan. Even now, Scotland is having a referendum on independence from the UK. Catalonia is attempting to leave Spain. And of course, there are all the pathetic secession attempts on the White House petition site.

This fracturing of states may go a long way toward proving Bartlett's first point. As the relative power to influence the government decreases, groups that feel disenfranchised leave to create their own democracy. If we play out this trend over hundreds of years, it could be extremely possible that the world map will look more like it did during Aristotle's time: a collection of self administered city-states.

So what about his second point?

In the age before the internet, representative democracy was the only option. Voting took an inordinate amount of time, and with communication taking days, there was no feasible way to have a direct democracy. Now, all the information you need to make an informed decision is available in a matter of seconds. You can communicate your decision with the click of a button. In 100 years, will there be a need for an elected body of officials? I don't think so.

I say that a "digitocracy" will replace democracy. People will be able to vote on any issue in a matter of seconds. In a way, it is a return to the New England Town Hall meeting. Everyone could participate. Decisions could be made quickly, and the impact of those decisions (for better or worse) would be limited to the people that made the decision.

Of course, this is an awfully optimistic view for the future. It could easily go the way Bartlett describes in his paper, but I like to think that humanity will somehow rally around the common good of civic participation. All that being said, either view would make a pretty good sci-fi novel.

Forecasting A Russian Revolution

When I say "Russia", Americans typically think one of three things: Vodka, Caviar, or Communism.

I think differently. Having studied Russian political history for several years one word stands ahead of all those: revolutionary.

The only revolution most remember is the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.  Russia's first televised revolution sent many strong images, notably Boris Yeltsin addressing a crowd atop a tank before the besieged Russian Parliament.

However, this was neither their first nor will be their last revolution.  The years of 1917, 1905, 1881, 1825, 1773, 1708, 1670, 1610, 1607, and 1605 all witnessed revolutions or armed uprisings of some type. These are only revolutions that occurred within Russia's borders; for now I am omitting the Prague Spring, Polish October, Hungarian revolution, and the various post-Soviet color revolutions. That being said, Russian revolutions are predictable; they arise when a perfect blend of variables align, and their successes or failures depend on how the population is impacted by the variables.

I mean who wouldn't vote for that...

This is incredibly important today.  Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin just won his third term as President of the Russian Federation.  CNN and the BBC have blasted the results citing ballot stuffing and carousel voting (people being bussed from poll to poll, each voting multiple times).  Russian state-run network RIA Novosti said that Putin "trounced the rivals with 63.6% of the vote", and while opposition groups are beginning to plan rallies against Putin, they are being met with substantial force from the government with many protestors being arrested for attending "unsanctioned protests".

Yes, protests must be sanctioned by the government in the motherland...

Many people are wondering if Russia is headed toward yet another revolution, and it could be.  However, we must first examine the variables.

The first and most important variable in Russian revolutions is the price of food.  Historically, the price of grain/bread determines the willingness of the population, particularly low-income citizens, to participate in an uprising.  The Revolution of 1905 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were marked by bread riots occurring in major cities.  Likewise, Pugachev's Rebellion of 1773-74 also originated in-part because of crop failure.  Even outside Russia, food price is a major variable in revolutions.  The French Revolution was marked by high wheat prices, and the many revolutions of 1848 had origins in the 1845-47 economic recession and food shortage.

Even the recent Arab Spring may have been caused by food (ironically enough, Russian food). Plagued by drought and wildfires in 2010, Russia stopped exporting grain.  A report by Oxfam highlighting the impact of the ban stated that, "Egypt was Russia’s biggest customer and the Egyptian government committed to maintaining the price of the cheapest bread. This was enormously expensive for the government and ultimately the population as a whole, but will have minimized the impact of the price-rise on the poorest households."  Though the Egyptian government was "committed to [maintain] the price of the cheapest bread" they did not have time to do it.  Their government was overthrown within 6 months of the Russian export ban.

Price of Wheat from 1960-2011

Also, grain prices in Russia have remained unusually high for the past several years, and even now Russia is considering curbing their exports.  An extremely harsh winter this year has wreaked havoc on the production of winter wheat, and exporting ports have been unable to keep up quotas because of ice. While lower exports may stabilize the price at home, it will likely cause more trouble in the Middle East (Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan are a few of the largest importers of Russian grain, so prices in these countries will rise most, meaning these countries will have a higher chance of political turmoil in the next year).

The second major variable in Russian revolutions is newly accepted ideology. As a population begins to reflect the values of a new line of thought, they are more likely to challenge the status quo.  This was most obvious during the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century with the emergence of nihilism, anarchism and communism. Nihilism was first labeled in Ivan Turgenev's novel Fathers and Sons (I highly recommend reading it).  The book highlights the difference in values between generations, notably the difference between those who still had faith in the Russian crown and those who value nothing (more specifically, those who did not respect another mans authority over him).  This belief was carried further by the actions of The People's Will, one of the first terrorist organizations, who successfully assassinated Tsar Alexander II on March 13, 1881.  This group and the other radical organizations of the late nineteenth century were not met with the success they had hoped for.  Despite assassinating the Tsar and successfully unionizing some factories in southern Russia and Ukraine the population was not yet willing to join a revolt largely because the economy was successful, Russia was not involved in costly wars, and the peasantry was repressed to a point where they feared joining a cause.

This changed by 1905.  Russia had taken a beating from Japan during the Russo-Japanese war, and the economy was hurting.  The people called for political reform, and got it to a degree.  The government became a constitutional monarchy with the formation of the State Duma (like the Senate) and even had a multi-party system.  But these reforms were too little too late.  WWI brought extreme dissatisfaction to the crown, and bad logistics caused more crop failures and higher prices.  Combined with this was the ever charismatic Vladimir Lenin, whose platform of "peace, bread, and land" proved irresistible...

Is there a wider acceptance of new ideology in Russia today?  When one looks at the voting record between 1991 and 2012 it does not seem that way.  However, a lack of evidence on record does not mean the phenomena does not exist.  Non-Putin parties have grown from 20% to 40% of the vote in recent years, and given Moscow's record of vote fraud, that number should probably be a bit larger.  More than this, opposition parties have begun to cooperate during protests.  Communists have marched alongside Liberal Democrats and other parties, showing that while divisions remain, there is growing unity behind anything that is not Putin's United Russia.

December 2011 protests

The final variable is foreign support through either NGO's or direct action. In Russia's Imperial past foreign interference has been a major factor in revolts.  The aptly named "Time of Troubles" in the early 1600's saw three foreign sponsored (Polish) "heirs" to the Russian throne; each claiming to be the son of the late Tsar Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible). More recently, during the Russian Civil War (1917-1923) American, French, and British soldiers invaded, trying to keep the Tsar in power.  Beginning in the early 90's many Pro-west NGO's set up shop in Russia and other former Soviet Socialist Republics. Their impact has been limited in Russia, but they have produced direct results elsewhere (anywhere a color revolution occurred, a western NGO was involved).

So, given these factors, will Russia experience a revolution?  As of right now, no.

Western ideas have caught a larger base in Russia due to the impact of NGO's, but the Russian government is not stupid, and they know the exact agenda of these groups meaning their impact can be curbed by state measures.  Ideas about market capitalism have also struggled, not because they do not work, but because the privatization campaigns of the early nineties were poorly executed, which caused a handful of very corrupt men to become enormously wealthy. Finally, and most importantly, the cost of food has been high but stable, meaning people are less willing to step up for a cause. If a major drought bordering on famine impacted Russia, then the government should worry, but for now and despite the best attempts of Russian opposition, a revolution remains unlikely.

However, the growing unrest is becoming louder, and civil society has begun to flourish. A change for the better remains close at hand, but it will likely come through reform rather than revolution.

President's Day

Seeing that today is President's Day, and due to a recommendation from my friend Scott, I decided to take a look at JFK's inaugural address.  The climate in which JFK took office is not unlike our own.  The world was a tumultuous place in 1961; arguably it was one of the most dangerous periods in American history.  I will venture to say that it was more dangerous than it is now.

Khrushchev famously slamming his shoe on the podium at the UN

The Soviet Union was at the height of it's power; Nikita Khrushchev scared the crap out of Americans.  The Civil Rights movement was just taking shape. Nuclear fear gripped America from "duck and cover" to the construction of fallout shelters nationwide.

Bert the Turtle: "Duck and Cover"

In the mire of fear surrounding the decade, a young Senator from Massachusetts was elected to the highest office in the country.  His first words to our nation were not of fear; they were words of hope and came with a promise: a restoration of American values.

"The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe—the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God.

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world."

Today, we still hold the power to help all men, and we still have the power to wipe all life from the face of our planet.  We know our rights come from our existence, but many amongst us have bought into the fear of the modern world. People have sacrificed our rights for the government's "security". 

Now, there is a new generation coming of age; we are the heirs of bad policy, spiraling debt, a forgotten constitution, and a crumbling empire. We have been tempered by 11 years of war.  We have been disciplined by the hard and bitter peace of the 90's. We are more proud than ever of our heritage because our government has forgotten it. We want the torch to be passed to us, and with it we will reignite the dwindling fire of liberty, not only in the American spirit, but in the whole world.

"In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than in mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation"—a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.

Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility—I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man."

It is the last two sentences that are most forgotten today. Americans expect the government to be the creator of jobs, the guarantor of economic survival, and the defender of liberty. The governments track record in all of those endeavors is, quite frankly, terrible.

Citizens have come to expect their existence to originate from their government, and the government has come to expect itself to do the same. Most people know that second-to-last sentence: "ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country".  Yet few believe it.

Even fewer know the last line: "ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man." Many states in the world have come to expect America to be there for them, to protect them with our hot lead umbrella. They have intentionally allowed their own defenses to be weakened to the point that now, should a conflict arise, they are hopelessly unprepared. They join with us, not because they wish for the freedom of man, but because we have subsidized their right to exist.

Americans, today, we need another John F. Kennedy.  We need a President who is fearless, but not reckless.  Who is impatient, but not permissive. A president who leads from the front with support from all walks of life. Most importantly we need a President who truly believes in the value of the individual, because from the individual will stem all successes and failures of our species.

Did the Great Game ever end?

For those unfamiliar with the history of Afghanistan (as most Americans are) the US-led coalition and Hamid Karzai's "Afghan tested, American approved" government are not the first time a greater power has attempted to control the region for political supremacy.

We've all heard the statement that "the third times a charm", but in the case of our coalition it's more like the 4th or 5th time is a charm.  In fact, only one person ever successfully conquered and held Afghanistan: Genghis Khan, all way back in 1219AD.

Afghanistan's high point of regional power came in the early 18th century, when, after expelling their Persian leaders (the 1st failed foreign occupation), they attempted to conquer India and were subsequently expelled by the Sikhs.

Coinciding with this, the empires of Great Britain and Russia hit a phase of rapid expansion.  Great Britain acquired many of it's colonial holdings, most notably India.  Russia expanded from the Baltic, to the Black and Caspian Seas, across the endless Siberian steppe, eventually to the Pacific.  This placed Afghanistan and most of Central Asia in the sights of the two superpowers.  Afghanistan was seen by Great Britain as the path of least resistance to it's Indian holdings; likewise, the Russians saw Afghanistan and Central Asia as buffer states along their massive border to prevent British expansion into the Russia's open, exposed prairie.

With the onset of the First Anglo-Afghan War, the Great Game began.  After the initial invasion, a puppet government was installed, but after a few years mobs on the street were attacking any European they could find.  The military garrison and government was driven out and completely decimated in their retreat back to India. (2nd failed foreign occupation)

Then came the Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars. Each were minor victories for Britain, but only because they learned from their first experience in the Kush Mountains. They did not occupy the country. The second war allowed Afghanistan to retain it's government, but it lost control of it's foreign policy; the third saw control of foreign policy returned to the Afghans. Instead of wasting man power trying to occupy and hold Afghanistan, the British set it up as a buffer state to Russia.

With the onset of World War I and the rise of Bolshevism the Great Game ended... or at least that's what most historians think.  I believe it was postponed and the rules were altered a little.  The United States began to play alongside Great Britain and the Soviet Union replaced Imperial Russia.  The Great Game resumed with George Kennan's X article; only the name of "the Great Game" was changed to "containment policy" (...the Great Game sounds better, doesn't it?).

Afghanistan was left out of the new Great Game for the better part of the twentieth century, until 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded to promote the growth of the fledgling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.  The Soviets were there for ten years, spending billions and killing millions.  And for those familiar with US policy, we funded the fight, supplying the mujahedeen with funding, advanced weapons, and training.  The funding continued until the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. (3rd failed occupation)

In the time between 1989 and 2001 Saudi Arabia and Iran backed opposing sides in a civil war to establish regional hegemony.  It was a costly and bloody fight, coming right on the tales of the Soviet Occupation.  This made the country extremely weak. So, over the years, Afghans who trained in Pakistan made their way back into the country and consolidated power, calling themselves the Taliban.

Now I should not have to explain anything past 2001. I'm pretty sure that being in the Kush Mountains eleven years and spending trillions on the Afghan Money Pit has, at least, shown Americans that our great building project isn't really working as intended.

Really what I want to know is why we thought we could do it.  We've all heard the adage that those who don't examine history are doomed to repeat it.  Every modern nation that has invaded Afghanistan before the US-led effort failed, spending themselves into oblivion while trying to maintain a valueless land area.  There are no major resources or ways to gain revenue in Afghanistan, and I'm sure that the people there, having been in a constant war since 1979 (or 33 years), would much rather be left to their own devices. No bureaucrat in London, Moscow, or Washington can understand the way this ancient nation functions, nor should they try to bend the Afghan people to their will.  It is clear that we are not wanted, as it was clear the Soviets were unwanted, as with the British and Persians before.  The people of Afghanistan want the same things we all do: a home, a family, a job.  A foreign government can not adequately provide those things, and history shows that it is completely foolish to try.

A final item of some importance: what happened to the governments of Persia, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain after failing in Afghanistan? Persia descended into anarchy because the Afghans killed the Shah. The Soviet Union went completely bankrupt and collapsed in 1991. Great Britain had the only positive outcome. After learning from their first mistake that occupation was foolish; they left Afghanistan to govern itself issuing in a period of peace in the region.

On the Balance of Threat Theory

In 1985, Stephen M. Walt (from Foreign Policy and The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy) published an article in International Security titled "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power".  Speaking to idea that states either balance --join with another state against a growing threat-- or bandwagon --join with the threat to guarantee survival--, Walt's theory of international relations (IR), now called Balance of Threat theory, postulates that 4 distinct threats shape alliance formation in IR:

1) Aggregate Power- total combined resources of a state greatly exceeds others
2) Proximate Power- location of a threat shapes alliances for neighboring states
3) Offensive Power- military capabilities of a state
4) Offensive Intentions- an aggressive/expansionist foreign policy

When these threats are applied to the balancing/bandwagoning argument Walt proposes two different hypotheses:

Balancing- "If balancing is the dominant tendency [in IR], then threatening states will provoke others to align against them... Credibility [of allies] is less important in a balancing world because one's allies will resist threatening states out of their own self-interest, not because they expect others to do it for them."

Bandwagoning- "If states tend to ally with the strongest and most threatening state, then powers will be rewarded if they appear both strong and potentially dangerous. International rivalries will be more intense, because a single defeat may signal the decline of one side and the ascendancy of the other... Moreover, if statesmen believe that bandwagoning is widespread, they will be more inclined to use force to resolve international disputes. This is because they will both fear the gains that others may make by demonstrating their power or resolve, and because they will assume that others will be unlikely to balance against them."

Following this, Walt goes on to say that, historically, balancing is the norm (example- France/Russia vs. Germany/Austria-Hungary in WWI); however, bandwagoning occasionally occurs (example- Finland/USSR during the Cold War).

The balance/bandwagon argument becomes complicated with the addition of ideology. In much political rhetoric, especially during the Cold War, ideological birds of a feather, indeed, flocked together; yet, through the examples of international communism and pan-arabism Walt also notes that birds of a feather can fly apart:

International Communism supposed that Moscow was the vanguard, and it exercised it's global influence accordingly; however, as China became more powerful it began to break away from Moscow's influence culminating in the Sino-Soviet split. In Yugoslavia, Tito also split from the Soviet Union with the idea that there are many roads to socialism.

Likewise Pan-Arabic ideology, despite the obvious cultural commonalities between middle eastern countries, could never really take off.  Pan-Arabism required states to relinquish their power to become part of the larger picture, but the problem was to whom would power be relinquished? Nasser's Egypt or Saddam Hussein's Ba'athism?  In the end no consensus was reached, and with Nasser's death the experiment also died.

I wish to apply the two above examples to our modern international climate.  More specifically, I want to address how the United States, by subsidizing the defense of Europe with NATO, has elicited a bandwagoning response by EU nations and others.  I must give credit to Walt in his assertion that balancing against power is the historical norm; however, norms do change with time. Starting in 1945 through the collapse of the Soviet Union to present, bandwagoning has been the normal response to the United States in it's alliances.

Much of this argument extends from other portions of Walt's paper.  He cites "bribery" as a leading cause for states to form/remain in alliances.  To quote Walt on bribery, "the provision of economic or military assistance will create effective allies, either by demonstrating one's own favorable intentions, by invoking a sense of gratitude, or because the recipient will become dependent on the donor." He goes on to highlight the big problems with buying allies:

1) That in a world with multiple superpowers a recipient who is displeased with the aid it is receiving can get it elsewhere.
2) Recipients will try harder to get more aid because they are weaker than the one providing it, and if the provider feels that stopping the aid will lead to vulnerability, they are more reluctant to cut the funding.
3) The more important the ally is to the provider; the more aid it will receive. This gives the smaller state a substantial advantage for bargaining when it knows it's own importance.
4) By providing aid, the weaker state gains more strength and, eventually, has less need to follow the provider's wishes.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States was the sole protector of Europe.  At the time it made sense for the United States, being relatively unscathed by the second world war, to defend Europe.  It allowed European nations to place a limited amount of resources in defense spending freeing up the funds for rebuilding their economies.  It made the dollar, based on gold, the international standard, propelling the US to new heights of wealth and prosperity.  Finally, it took away much of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union because, if one American were killed, it would be all out war.

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact left NATO in an identity crisis.  It's use as a balancing force against the Warsaw Pact ended. So instead of completely restructuring itself, allowing the EU to take over the function of collective defense; it expanded becoming an offensive instrument of Washington's foreign policy with Europe bandwagoning because of dependence.

This can be seen by NATO's roll in Afghanistan. If troop commitments to a conflict are taken as a test for bandwagoning behavior in an alliance, coalition forces that are not US military personnel account for a minimal number of soldiers on the ground. As of 6 Jan 2012, 90,000 (69%) of the total 130,386 soldiers in the ISAF are US forces. That means the remaining 40,386 (31%) of the total are from the other 49 nations in the coalition. Naturally many of these nations can not afford to contribute more; they are artificially weak from dependence on American personnel for 67 years.

In the Korean War 341,600 men made up the United Nations Security Council force; 300,000 (88%) were US personnel. In Vietnam the total international troop count was 601,100; of this, 536,100 (89%) were US personnel. In both cases, the governments of Europe bandwagoned with the US as it balanced the communist threat on their doorsteps.  With the removal of that threat in 1991, international support for US foreign policy objectives has plummeted.

This is where the failed examples of bribery --international communism and pan-arabism-- enter the discussion.  When subordinates of the Soviet Union or unified Arabic states had enough power to "fly apart" or step out of line with the ideological leader, they did.  That split is happening with our allies now.

Despite the economic woes of the Eurozone, the EU economy remains larger than that of the United States. According to the 2011 CIA World Factbook, the EU's economy is 15.39 trillion dollars compared to the United States' $15.05 trillion. Without threat from communism they no longer need us, the only reason we have not yet fully lost their support is because we give them a free ride on defense spending.  In order to be a member of NATO, states are supposed to spend 2% of their GDP on defense.

In a 2011 article to The Daily Caller, the Cato Institute's Ted Carpenter highlighted the problem caused by bribing Europe:

"...even before the economic crisis led to drastic budget slashing, spending levels in several countries (including such major allies as Germany and Italy) were closer to one percent of GDP than two. And matters have gotten worse in the past two years. The $700 billion US defense budget now accounts for an astonishing 74 percent of total spending by NATO members.  The other 26 members of the alliance spend a mere $220 billion-- despite having a collective economy larger than that of the United States."

So, if Europe bandwagons with the United States because of dependency, and if we believe Walt's theory that a bandwagoning world is substantially less safe than a balancing world, then we must evaluate whether NATO is costly or beneficial to the United States.

As seen above, financially, it is not. And in these economic dire straights, that reason should be paramount. Beyond that and within the last two years, we have also witnessed a new phenomenon: Europe championing regime change, but expecting the United States to fight the battle, as was the case in Libya and will soon be the case in Syria. Yes, in each case the leaders are/were terrible men; however, if Europe wants the fight so bad, let them do it without our help.  The United States needs to get its economic house of cards in order domestically before spending itself into oblivion by policing the world.  Moreover, (and repeating Walt's argument) if we really want a safer world, we need to let our birds fly apart.

One would think that this is easier said than done, but really it could be accomplished fairly easily keeping Europe safe and allowing the US economy to recover.  The biggest problem is appeasing our own Military Industrial Complex (MIC), but even that can be done.  If we sold our European bases, and their subsequent fighter/bomber/support wings this whole problem would be solved.  The aircraft we field in Europe are all outdated, built in the 70's and 80's.  However, each year we spend billions refitting and updating them.  If Europe took over their maintenance, then the MIC would be satisfied as they would still receive revenue for parts and maintenance.  Europe would be safe because all of a sudden it would have it's own military capabilities again.  The United States would be more secure economically, and again, the MIC would be satisfied because we could focus efforts at home on building more advanced aircraft, making our own nation even safer than it is now.  We would not necessarily have to leave NATO, but our membership as well as Europe's would finally reach a point of balance and safety for the first time in 67 years. This is the logical step, and one that should be taken before our house of cards collapses.