Forecasting A Russian Revolution

When I say "Russia", Americans typically think one of three things: Vodka, Caviar, or Communism.

I think differently. Having studied Russian political history for several years one word stands ahead of all those: revolutionary.

The only revolution most remember is the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.  Russia's first televised revolution sent many strong images, notably Boris Yeltsin addressing a crowd atop a tank before the besieged Russian Parliament.

However, this was neither their first nor will be their last revolution.  The years of 1917, 1905, 1881, 1825, 1773, 1708, 1670, 1610, 1607, and 1605 all witnessed revolutions or armed uprisings of some type. These are only revolutions that occurred within Russia's borders; for now I am omitting the Prague Spring, Polish October, Hungarian revolution, and the various post-Soviet color revolutions. That being said, Russian revolutions are predictable; they arise when a perfect blend of variables align, and their successes or failures depend on how the population is impacted by the variables.

I mean who wouldn't vote for that...

This is incredibly important today.  Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin just won his third term as President of the Russian Federation.  CNN and the BBC have blasted the results citing ballot stuffing and carousel voting (people being bussed from poll to poll, each voting multiple times).  Russian state-run network RIA Novosti said that Putin "trounced the rivals with 63.6% of the vote", and while opposition groups are beginning to plan rallies against Putin, they are being met with substantial force from the government with many protestors being arrested for attending "unsanctioned protests".

Yes, protests must be sanctioned by the government in the motherland...

Many people are wondering if Russia is headed toward yet another revolution, and it could be.  However, we must first examine the variables.

The first and most important variable in Russian revolutions is the price of food.  Historically, the price of grain/bread determines the willingness of the population, particularly low-income citizens, to participate in an uprising.  The Revolution of 1905 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were marked by bread riots occurring in major cities.  Likewise, Pugachev's Rebellion of 1773-74 also originated in-part because of crop failure.  Even outside Russia, food price is a major variable in revolutions.  The French Revolution was marked by high wheat prices, and the many revolutions of 1848 had origins in the 1845-47 economic recession and food shortage.

Even the recent Arab Spring may have been caused by food (ironically enough, Russian food). Plagued by drought and wildfires in 2010, Russia stopped exporting grain.  A report by Oxfam highlighting the impact of the ban stated that, "Egypt was Russia’s biggest customer and the Egyptian government committed to maintaining the price of the cheapest bread. This was enormously expensive for the government and ultimately the population as a whole, but will have minimized the impact of the price-rise on the poorest households."  Though the Egyptian government was "committed to [maintain] the price of the cheapest bread" they did not have time to do it.  Their government was overthrown within 6 months of the Russian export ban.

Price of Wheat from 1960-2011

Also, grain prices in Russia have remained unusually high for the past several years, and even now Russia is considering curbing their exports.  An extremely harsh winter this year has wreaked havoc on the production of winter wheat, and exporting ports have been unable to keep up quotas because of ice. While lower exports may stabilize the price at home, it will likely cause more trouble in the Middle East (Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan are a few of the largest importers of Russian grain, so prices in these countries will rise most, meaning these countries will have a higher chance of political turmoil in the next year).

The second major variable in Russian revolutions is newly accepted ideology. As a population begins to reflect the values of a new line of thought, they are more likely to challenge the status quo.  This was most obvious during the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century with the emergence of nihilism, anarchism and communism. Nihilism was first labeled in Ivan Turgenev's novel Fathers and Sons (I highly recommend reading it).  The book highlights the difference in values between generations, notably the difference between those who still had faith in the Russian crown and those who value nothing (more specifically, those who did not respect another mans authority over him).  This belief was carried further by the actions of The People's Will, one of the first terrorist organizations, who successfully assassinated Tsar Alexander II on March 13, 1881.  This group and the other radical organizations of the late nineteenth century were not met with the success they had hoped for.  Despite assassinating the Tsar and successfully unionizing some factories in southern Russia and Ukraine the population was not yet willing to join a revolt largely because the economy was successful, Russia was not involved in costly wars, and the peasantry was repressed to a point where they feared joining a cause.

This changed by 1905.  Russia had taken a beating from Japan during the Russo-Japanese war, and the economy was hurting.  The people called for political reform, and got it to a degree.  The government became a constitutional monarchy with the formation of the State Duma (like the Senate) and even had a multi-party system.  But these reforms were too little too late.  WWI brought extreme dissatisfaction to the crown, and bad logistics caused more crop failures and higher prices.  Combined with this was the ever charismatic Vladimir Lenin, whose platform of "peace, bread, and land" proved irresistible...

Is there a wider acceptance of new ideology in Russia today?  When one looks at the voting record between 1991 and 2012 it does not seem that way.  However, a lack of evidence on record does not mean the phenomena does not exist.  Non-Putin parties have grown from 20% to 40% of the vote in recent years, and given Moscow's record of vote fraud, that number should probably be a bit larger.  More than this, opposition parties have begun to cooperate during protests.  Communists have marched alongside Liberal Democrats and other parties, showing that while divisions remain, there is growing unity behind anything that is not Putin's United Russia.

December 2011 protests

The final variable is foreign support through either NGO's or direct action. In Russia's Imperial past foreign interference has been a major factor in revolts.  The aptly named "Time of Troubles" in the early 1600's saw three foreign sponsored (Polish) "heirs" to the Russian throne; each claiming to be the son of the late Tsar Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible). More recently, during the Russian Civil War (1917-1923) American, French, and British soldiers invaded, trying to keep the Tsar in power.  Beginning in the early 90's many Pro-west NGO's set up shop in Russia and other former Soviet Socialist Republics. Their impact has been limited in Russia, but they have produced direct results elsewhere (anywhere a color revolution occurred, a western NGO was involved).

So, given these factors, will Russia experience a revolution?  As of right now, no.

Western ideas have caught a larger base in Russia due to the impact of NGO's, but the Russian government is not stupid, and they know the exact agenda of these groups meaning their impact can be curbed by state measures.  Ideas about market capitalism have also struggled, not because they do not work, but because the privatization campaigns of the early nineties were poorly executed, which caused a handful of very corrupt men to become enormously wealthy. Finally, and most importantly, the cost of food has been high but stable, meaning people are less willing to step up for a cause. If a major drought bordering on famine impacted Russia, then the government should worry, but for now and despite the best attempts of Russian opposition, a revolution remains unlikely.

However, the growing unrest is becoming louder, and civil society has begun to flourish. A change for the better remains close at hand, but it will likely come through reform rather than revolution.